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Consciousness and Attention

Christopher Mole

The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness July 9, 2020 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198749677.013.23

Summary

The word 'attention' is often used loosely, but this paper treats it as a term defined by its role in explaining empirical psychological phenomena, particularly those involving reaction-time modulations. Evidence shows that such modulations are linked to processing that stands in various relations to consciousness. The psychological phenomena that explain these modulations should not be identified with the causes of consciousness, nor do they operate exclusively within conscious awareness. If such explanations are to shed light on how and when consciousness occurs, they must do so within a more complex explanatory theory.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Citations 14
Key finding The psychological phenomena that explain reaction-time modulations should not be identified with the causes of consciousness, nor do they operate exclusively within conscious awareness.

Abstract

The English word ‘attention’ can be used loosely. As a tactic for preventing an enquiry into attention’s relationship to consciousness from lapsing into ill-definition, we shall treat ‘attention’ as a term to be defined by the role that is assigned to it in our explanations of empirically established psychological phenomena (especially those involving the modulation of reaction times). We will review evidence that shows that such modulations are associated with processing that stands in various relations to consciousness. The psychological phenomena that explain such modulations should not be identified with the causes of consciousness. Nor do they operate exclusively within the field of conscious awareness. If the explanation of those phenomena is to cast explanatory light on how and when consciousness occurs, it will need to do so in the context of some more complex explanatory theory.

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