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Emotional Experience

Julien Deonna, Fabrice Teroni

The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness July 9, 2020 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198749677.013.5

Summary

Emotions have distinctive felt qualities that may explain key features such as valence (positive or negative), how emotions are individuated from one another, their intentional objects, and their motivational force. Using the example of anger at a nasty remark, the chapter argues that attending to emotional phenomenology supports specific accounts of these four features, suggesting that how an emotion feels is integral to understanding its nature and role.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Citations 14
Key finding Focusing on emotional phenomenology encourages specific accounts of valence, individuation, intentionality, and motivation in emotions.

Abstract

This chapter explores substantive accounts of emotional phenomenology, in order to see whether it sheds light on key features of emotions. To this end, it focuses on four features that can be introduced by way of an example. Say Sam is angry at Maria’s nasty remark. The first feature relates to the fact that anger is a negative emotion, by contrast with positive emotions such as joy and admiration (valence). The second feature is how anger differs from other emotions such as sadness, fear, and joy (individuation). The third concerns the objects of anger and the sense in which anger discloses the significance of Maria’s remark to Sam (intentionality). Finally, there is anger’s relation to behaviour (motivation). Does focusing on emotional phenomenology encourage specific accounts of these features? This chapter argues that there are reasons to think it does.

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