Bivs, Space and 'In'.

Summary

A novel anti-sceptical argument against the brain-in-a-vat (BIV) scenario is developed by examining the conditions under which the locative preposition 'in' is produced and used. Two uses of 'in' are distinguished: material and descriptive phenomenological. Movement is central to the concept that use of 'in' expresses. A functionalist semantics of the intelligible use of 'in' demands a materialist philosophy of action in the spirit of G.E.M. Anscombe, but the structure of space is not irrelevant; it unsettles the causal-empirical assumptions grounding the BIV narrative's picture of subjectivity and agency. Finally, functionalist semantics demands a Naïve Realist metaphysics of perception, consistent with some of Putnam's later writings.

Study at a glance

Abstract

I present a novel anti-sceptical BIV argument by focusing on conditions on the production and use of the locative preposition 'in'. I distinguish two uses of 'in'-material and descriptive phenomenological-and I explain in what respect movement is central to the concept that our use of 'in' expresses. I go on to argue that a functionalist semantics of the intelligible use of 'in' demands a materialist philosophy of action in the spirit of G.E.M. Anscombe, but also why the structure of space is not irrelevant either; appeal to the structure of space unsettles the causal-empirical assumptions that ground the picture of subjectivity and agency that the biv narrative assumes. Finally, I explain why a functionalist semantics demands a Naïve Realist metaphysics of perception, consistent with some of Putnam's last writings on philosophy of perception.