Six views of embodied cognition
January 1, 2002 DOI: 10.3758/bf03196322 via CORE
Summary
The paper examines six distinct claims within the embodied cognition viewpoint, which holds that cognitive processes are rooted in the body's interactions with the world. The first three claims—that cognition is situated, time-pressured, and off-loaded onto the environment—and the fifth claim, that cognition is for action, appear at least partially true and are best evaluated by their range of applicability. The fourth claim, that the environment is part of the cognitive system, is argued to be deeply problematic. The sixth claim, that off-line cognition is body-based, has received the least attention but may be the best documented and most powerful.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Of six claims within embodied cognition, the first three and the fifth appear at least partially true, the fourth is deeply problematic, and the sixth may be the best documented and most powerful. |
Abstract
The emerging viewpoint of embodied cognition holds that cognitive processes are deeply rooted in the body’s interactions with the world. This position actually houses a number of distinct claims, some of which are more controversial than others. This paper distinguishes and evaluates the following six claims: 1) cognition is situated; 2) cognition is time-pressured; 3) we off-load cognitive work onto the environment; 4) the environment is part of the cognitive system; 5) cognition is for action; 6) off-line cognition is body-based. Of these, the first three and the fifth appear to be at least partially true, and their usefulness is best evaluated in terms of the range of their applicability. The fourth claim, I argue, is deeply problematic. The sixth claim has received the least attention in the literature on embodied cognition, but it may in fact be the best documented and most powerful of the six claims