Revisiting the neuroscientific evidence for unconscious perception - the implications of affordances theory and biased competition.

Summary

The equivalence hypothesis claims that conscious and unconscious perception rely on the same brain areas. This paper argues that interpretation is incompatible with the biased competition model, where different interpretations of reality compete and one must be suppressed. In that framework, a representation is defined not only by active information but also by suppressed information. Currently, there is no evidence that primes can suppress alternative interpretations. Biased competition explains why primes often merely bias the agent rather than becoming real targets for behavior. The theoretical proposal awaits further empirical investigation.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Neuroscientific support for the equivalence hypothesis, stating that perception can be either conscious or unconscious, rests upon overlap in the brain areas activated during conscious perception and subliminal priming. This interpretation is argued here incompatible with the implications of the biased competition model, wherein different interpretations of the world compete and one must be suppressed in favor of the other. In such a framework a representation should not only be defined by what information is active, but also by what information is suppressed. Currently there is no reason to believe that the content of primes can suppress alternative interpretations of reality. The implications of biased competition elegantly explain why primes often merely bias the agent, instead of being real targets for behavior. Our theoretical proposal awaits further empirical investigation.