Journal of Vision
June 26, 2015
Yair Pinto, Simon van Gaal, Floris P. de Lange et al.
177 citations
Expectations speed up conscious perception. In four experiments using predictive cueing and continuous flash suppression, expected images entered awareness faster than neutral or unexpected ones. This effect was not due to response priming, stimulus associations, or attentional timing biases. Top-down expectations had a stronger influence when visual input was ambiguous, consistent with predictive processing accounts. The findings support the idea that conscious access depends on verifying perceptual predictions.
Neuropsychology Review
May 12, 2020
Edward H.F. de Haan, Paul M. Corballis, Steven A. Hillyard et al.
86 citations
Cutting the corpus callosum (split-brain) broadly disrupts functional integration across perception and attention, but some processes like action control remain unified. The key unresolved question is whether split-brain patients have split or unified consciousness. Current evidence is insufficient to decide, and future studies may need to consider intermediate conceptualizations beyond a simple yes or no.
Science
January 25, 2018
Olivia Carter, Jakob Hohwy, Jeroen J. A. van Boxtel et al.
86 citations
A commentary argues that Dehaene et al.'s review on consciousness and machines asks and answers the wrong questions, implying that their conclusions about not being on the verge of creating conscious machines may be premature or misdirected.
Journal of Experimental Psychology General
January 30, 2017
Yair Pinto, Annelinde R. E. Vandenbroucke, Marte Otten et al.
23 citations
Change blindness—the failure to notice unattended changes in a visual scene—has been taken as evidence that conscious perception requires spatial attention. However, change blindness tasks introduce visual interference that forces reliance on working memory, which has limited capacity. Before such interference, a larger-capacity store called fragile memory exists. Two experiments show that minimizing spatial attention nearly eliminates visual working memory but leaves fragile memory largely intact. Furthermore, minimally attended fragile memory responses produce accurate metacognition, indicating that conscious memory persists with limited spatial attention. These findings suggest that both visual consciousness and memory can be supported by only minimal attention.