Consciousness can be better understood by decomposing it into distinct information-theoretic elements rather than measuring it as a single quantity of integrated information. The authors propose Integrated Information Decomposition (ΦID), which provides a formal argument that whether consciousness is an emergent phenomenon depends on its information-theoretic composition. Two organisms may have the same amount of integrated information yet differ in composition. A new measure, ΦR, and the ΦR-ing ratio quantify how efficiently information is used for conscious processing. This approach enables identification of qualitatively different 'modes of consciousness' and mapping them to phenomenology, starting with selfhood. ΦID offers new ways to explore the relationship between information, consciousness, and neural dynamics.
Consciousness can be understood not as a single unified thing but as composed of distinct information-theoretic elements. A new approach called Integrated Information Decomposition (ΦID) shifts from measuring how much integrated information a system has to analyzing its composition. This provides a formal way to determine whether consciousness is an emergent phenomenon based on that composition. Two organisms can have the same amount of integrated information yet differ in its composition. A new measure, ΦR, and the ΦR-ing rate quantify how efficiently an entity uses information for conscious processing. This decomposition identifies qualitatively different 'modes of consciousness,' enabling mapping between phenomenology and information-theoretic structure, starting with selfhood.