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Consciousness, 4E cognition and Aristotle: a few conceptual and historical aspects.

Diana Stanciu

Frontiers in computational neuroscience January 1, 2023 DOI: 10.3389/fncom.2023.1204602 via PubMed

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

The new approach in cognitive science known as 4E cognition (embodied, embedded, enactive, extended) may revive certain Aristotelian concepts, particularly his notion of nature as an inner impulse to movement that is neither fully corporeal nor incorporeal, and his distinction between active and passive intellect. By analyzing Aristotle's definitions in Physics, On the Parts of Animals, and On the Soul, the author argues that the mind-body problem central to explaining consciousness can be partially eluded or transcended through a subtle account of causation. Recent neuroscience findings on consciousness could be better understood within a 4E cognition paradigm inspired by these Aristotelian views.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords 4e cognition Aristotle Active intellect Brain networks dynamics Causality
Citations 5
Key finding Aristotelian concepts of nature and active intellect, interpreted within a 4E cognition paradigm, can help explain recent neuroscience findings on consciousness while partially transcending the mind-body problem.

Abstract

The new approach in cognitive science largely known as "4E cognition" (embodied/embedded/enactive/extended cognition), which sheds new light on the complex dynamics of human consciousness, seems to revive some of Aristotle's views. For instance, the concept of "nature" (phusis) and the discussion on "active intellect" (nous poiêtikos) may be particularly relevant in this respect. Out of the various definitions of "nature" in Aristotle's Physics, On the Parts of Animals and Second Analytics, I will concentrate on nature defined as an inner impulse to movement, neither entirely "corporeal," nor entirely "incorporeal," and neither entirely "substantial," nor entirely "accidental." Related to that, I will consider the distinction in On the Soul between the "active" and the "passive" intellect, which Aristotle asserted as generally present in "nature" itself. By offering a conceptual and historical analysis of these views, I intend to show how the mind-body problem, which is essential for the explanation of consciousness, could be somewhat either eluded or transcended by both ancients and contemporaries on the basis of a subtle account of causation. While not attempting to diminish the impact of the Cartesian paradigm, which led to the so-called "hard problem of consciousness," I suggest that the most recent neuroscience discoveries on the neurophysiological phenomena related to human consciousness could be better explained and understood if interpreted within a 4E cognition paradigm, inspired by some Aristotelian views.

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