Consciousness isn't "hard"-it's human psychology that makes it so!

Consciousness is often considered a 'hard problem' because it seems distinct from the physical world. This view relies on the assumptions that people do not see consciousness as physical and that their intuitions accurately reflect reality. New experiments challenge both assumptions: in some scenarios, people view consciousness as a physical process occurring in the brain, and intuitions about the problem are linked to psychological biases, making them unreliable. The author concludes that the 'hard problem' has psychological roots, and resolving it requires understanding the mechanisms that produce these intuitions.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Consciousness arguably presents a "hard problem" for scholars. An influential position asserts that the "problem" is rooted in ontology-it arises because consciousness "is" distinct from the physical. "Problem intuitions" are routinely taken as evidence for this view. In so doing, it is assumed that (i) people do not consider consciousness as physical and (ii) their intuitions faithfully reflect what exists (or else, intuitions would not constitute evidence). New experimental results challenge both claims. First, in some scenarios, people demonstrably view consciousness as a physical affair that registers in the body (brain). Second, "problem intuitions" are linked to psychological biases, so they cannot be trusted to reflect what consciousness is. I conclude that the roots of the "hard problem" are partly psychological. Accordingly, its resolution requires careful characterization of the psychological mechanisms that engender "problem intuitions."