Embodied Consciousness Theory
arXiv Preprint Archive October 21, 2020 via arXiv
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractA new theory of consciousness, grounded in the brain's computational operations, proposes that motor cortex activity plays a key role in relaying conscious experiences. The theory argues that existing frameworks like global workspace theory and integrated information theory, while influential, do not fully explain consciousness because they either focus narrowly on neural correlates of mental effort or assume experience as an intrinsic brain property without addressing its non-physical aspects. The present work claims its approach is consistent with known neuroscience findings and provides a fundamental basis for physicalism, while also addressing meta-level problems of consciousness. The theory offers a simple, straightforward account rooted in the brain's information processing.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Q-bio.nc Consciousness Neuroscience Sensorimotor integration Cognitive science |
| Key finding | Motor cortex activity is indicated as relaying conscious experiences, providing a basis for physicalism and addressing meta-level problems of consciousness. |
Abstract
The mysterious phenomenon of consciousness, after having been the subject of philosophic attention for few millennia, has drawn much scientific curiosity in recent decades; and many brilliant minds of various areas of sciences are trying to throw some light on it. Present neuroscience knowledge allows envisioning the neural processes behind the physical aspects of consciousness, however what may be behind the experiences of it, which has no physical insignia, has remained a mystery despite the grounds gained in recent well received efforts: monumental endeavors concluding in the known theories such as global workspace theory (GWT) [1] and integrated information theory (IIT) [2], fall short of providing a solid theory for consciousness: the former proposes a simple hypothesis concerning the neural basis of 'making a conscious mental effort,' and the latter, assuming 'experience to be an intrinsic property of the brain,' formulates how it is transitioned, through certain information based neural activity, to its physical substrate. Present work puts forward a theory of consciousness, rooted in the simple and straightforward implications of the computational operation of the brain which is consistent with well known facts and recent findings, which indicates presence of motor cortex activity in relaying conscious experiences. Despite simplicity, the theory provides fundamental basis for physicalism [3], as well answers for some Meta level problems of consciousness.