Simultaneity of consciousness with physical reality: the key that unlocks the mind-matter problem

The relationship between subjective experience and physical reality remains unresolved. Most theories treat consciousness as epiphenomenal, lacking causal power, except Integrated Information Theory (IIT), which identifies consciousness with a specific physical information structure having intrinsic causal power. However, any psycho-physical identity theory leads to panpsychism, undermining claims to fundamentality. IIT's recent turn to strong causal emergence requires a new physical law or principle. This paper presents a deductive argument from phenomenologically certain premises, proving that conscious experience creates additional degrees of causal freedom independent of experience content, unpredictable and unobservable by sequential means. This provides a fundamental principle bridging consciousness and physics, with testable predictions about brain function differing from IIT.

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Abstract

The problem of explaining the relationship between subjective experience and physical reality remains difficult and unresolved. In most explanations, consciousness is epiphenomenal, without causal power. The most notable exception is Integrated Information Theory (IIT), which provides a causal explanation for consciousness. However, IIT relies on an identity between subjectivity and a particular type of physical structure, namely with an information structure that has intrinsic causal power greater than the sum of its parts. Any theory that relies on a psycho-physical identity must eventually appeal to panpsychism, which undermines that theorys claim to be fundamental. IIT has recently pivoted towards a strong version of causal emergence, but macroscopic causal structures cannot be causally stronger than its microscopic parts without some new physical law or governing principle. The approach taken here is designed to uncover such a principle. The decisive argument is entirely deductive from initial premises that are phenomenologically certain. If correct, the arguments prove that conscious experience is sufficient to create additional degrees of causal freedom independently of the content of experience, and in a manner that is unpredictable and unobservable by any temporally sequential means. This provides a fundamental principle about consciousness, and a conceptual bridge between it and the physics describing what is experienced. The principle makes testable predictions about brain function, with notable differences from IIT, some of which are also empirically testable.