Temporal Consciousness
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness July 9, 2020 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198749677.013.9
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractTemporal consciousness—how we perceive the timing and order of events—raises three core questions: how sensory experiences convey temporal information, whether the temporal structure of experiences themselves influences how they represent events, and how this appears in conscious awareness. Most theories are distinguished by their answers to these questions. This chapter outlines the main current theories and their assumptions, then critically reviews key arguments in the debate.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 57 |
| Key finding | The chapter surveys and critically evaluates competing theories of temporal consciousness, focusing on how sensory experiences represent temporal features of events. |
Abstract
The temporal aspects of experience raise three related questions, central to our understanding of temporal consciousness: how do sensory experiences carry information about, or make us aware of, some of the temporal features of perceived events (if at all)—in what format, by what mechanisms?; do the temporal properties of conscious experiences—including the arrangement of their temporal parts—play any role in how these experiences present or represent the temporal properties of perceived events?; how does such temporal representation manifest itself in the phenomenology of the relevant experiences? Most theories of temporal consciousness can be divided in terms of how they treat these questions. This chapter begins with a brief sketch of the main theories currently on the market and some of their background assumptions; it then moves to a—also brief—critical review of some of the arguments at the centre of the dispute.