Three concepts of Buddhist philosophy: «thought», «mind», «consciousness» (the problem of translation)
Sententiae March 31, 2026 DOI: 10.31649/sent40.02.030 via DOAJ
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe paper analyzes three key concepts in Buddhist philosophy of consciousness—citta, manas, and vijñāna—and examines challenges in translating them into Ukrainian. It argues that adequate translation requires comparing terms across Pali, Sanskrit, Chinese, and other traditions, and translating the entire system of Buddhist terminology rather than isolated terms, to avoid incompatibility. The author applies an original approach to Buddhist "philosophy of emptiness," interpreting it broadly as a union of three constituents: emptiness of things, emptiness of concepts, and emptiness of consciousness. An analysis of a passage from Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa (II.34) illustrates the need for systematic translation.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Buddhism |
| Keywords | Thought Mind Consciousness Citta |
| Citations | 1 |
| Key finding | The three terms citta, manas, and vijñāna all refer to 'thought-mind-consciousness' as substance whose ontological substratum is emptiness (ākāśa), yet each has distinct, sometimes antonymous, meanings. |
Abstract
The paper analyses the three main concepts of Buddhist philosophy of consciousness and considers the problem of their translation into Ukrainian. The author shows that it is necessary to compare the terms related to different Buddhist traditions’ (Pali, Sanskrit, Chinese and al.) in order to adequately translate them into modern languages. The analysis of a passage (II.34) from Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa in various translations points out the necessity to translate a whole system of Buddhist terminology, but not the separate terms taken individually, in order to avoid the incompatibility of translated terms with each other. The study uses the author’s original approach to the Buddhist «philosophy of emptiness». The Author interprets it in a wider sense as a union of three constituents: «emptiness of things», «emptiness of concepts» and «emptiness of consciousness». The paper demonstrates that all three terms, in their primary meaning, refer to the «thought-mind-consciousness» as substance, whose ontological substratum is «emptiness»-ākāśa. At the same time every one of these terms has a range of its own meanings and nuances which either do not overlap or even are antonymous by sense.