Philosophy and Science on the Way to Knowing and Making Consciousness
RUDN Journal of Philosophy January 10, 2023 DOI: 10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-4-740-754 via DOAJ
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractEmpirical theories of consciousness remain in a pre-paradigmatic stage, so they do not yet pose an existential threat to the philosophy of consciousness, though they demand its attention. The author clarifies the ambiguous term 'consciousness', separating aspects already open to science and technology from those unlikely to be explained away. The relationship between philosophy and science is analyzed through their inner dynamics of theories and ontologies, showing that the distinction between them is more important for science. Philosophical schemas claiming to be 'experiential' must meet criteria for empirical theories to explain anything. The author adds a pragmatic criterion: a winning theory must enable production and control of artificial conscious devices.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Intelligence Awareness Control Qualia Phenomenal consciousness |
| Citations | 2 |
| Key finding | Empirical theories of consciousness are still pre-paradigmatic, and a winning theory must eventually allow for the production and control of artificial conscious devices. |
Abstract
The latest progress in empirical studies of consciousness and spectacular advances in AI technologies kick philosophy out of the familiar comfort of uncontrolled proliferation of concepts and scholastic disputes. In the overview of the current state of empirical theories of consciousness, author reveals that those theories still find themselves in the pre-paradigmatic stage, therefore not yet posing an immediate existential threat to the philosophy of consciousness, though making it watch out. Author attempts to deal with the certain ambiguity of the term ‘consciousness’, stripping its meaning from parts already susceptible to science and technology and from parts still highly unlikely to be explained away. Besides, the relationship between philosophy and science is specified in general by analyzing them to their inner dynamics of theories and ontologies, showing that for science, the distinction between the two is substantially more important than for philosophy. From this perspective, philosophical schemas of consciousness claiming to be ‘experiential’ must have met recently formulated criteria for empirical theories of consciousness, otherwise failing to explain anything in the domain. Finally, author adds his pragmatic criterion that addresses the technological perspectives a theory provides. In the end, a winning competitive theory will have to let us produce and control artificial conscious devices.