Phenomenal Consciousness and Emergence: Eliminating the Explanatory Gap.

Consciousness arises from standard (weak) emergence in physical systems, not from a radical or strong form of emergence. The paper traces emergent features through three progressive levels: life, nervous systems, and special neurobiological features, each increasing in complexity and ultimately leading to phenomenal consciousness. The formulation Life + Special neurobiological features → Phenomenal consciousness expresses this relationship. Consciousness fits the criteria of an emergent property with extreme complexity. The authors conclude that consciousness stems from an organism's personal life combined with a complex nervous system that maximizes emergent neurobiological features, and that no scientific explanatory gap exists between brain and consciousness, though an experiential or epistemic gap remains that is ontologically untroubling.

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Abstract

The role of emergence in the creation of consciousness has been debated for over a century, but it remains unresolved. In particular there is controversy over the claim that a "strong" or radical form of emergence is required to explain phenomenal consciousness. In this paper we use some ideas of complex system theory to trace the emergent features of life and then of complex brains through three progressive stages or levels: Level 1 (life), Level 2 (nervous systems), and Level 3 (special neurobiological features), each representing increasing biological and neurobiological complexity and ultimately leading to the emergence of phenomenal consciousness, all in physical systems. Along the way we show that consciousness fits the criteria of an emergent property-albeit one with extreme complexity. The formulation Life + Special neurobiological features → Phenomenal consciousness expresses these relationships. Then we consider the implications of our findings for some of the philosophical conundrums entailed by the apparent "explanatory gap" between the brain and phenomenal consciousness. We conclude that consciousness stems from the personal life of an organism with the addition of a complex nervous system that is ideally suited to maximize emergent neurobiological features and that it is an example of standard ("weak") emergence without a scientific explanatory gap. An "experiential" or epistemic gap remains, although this is ontologically untroubling.