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Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access: an introduction.

Peter Fazekas, Morten Overgaard

Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences September 19, 2018 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2017.0340 via PubMed

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

The problem of explaining how subjective experiences like colors, sounds, and tastes arise from brain processes is often considered the greatest unsolved mystery. A key question is whether the neural basis of perceptual consciousness is separate from the neural basis of cognitive access mechanisms that allow reporting and reflecting on conscious experiences. This Theme Issue critically discusses current empirical findings, identifies methodological problems, and proposes novel approaches to this central issue in consciousness research.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Review Peer reviewed
Keywords Access consciousness Cognitive access Phenomenal consciousness
Citations 30
Key finding The neural basis of perceptual consciousness may be independent of the neural basis of cognitive access mechanisms, but this remains an open question requiring further empirical and methodological work.

Abstract

The problem of perceptual consciousness-the question of how our subjective experiences (colours as we see them; sounds as we hear them; tastes, etc., as we feel them) could be accounted for in terms of brain processes-is often regarded as the greatest unsolved mystery of our times. In recent literature, one of the most pressing questions in this regard is whether the neural basis of perceptual consciousness is independent of the neural basis of cognitive access mechanisms that make reporting and reflecting on conscious experiences possible. The Theme Issue focuses on this central problem of consciousness research and aims to contribute to the field by critically discussing state-of-the-art empirical findings, identifying methodological problems and proposing novel approaches.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.

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