Identifying phenomenal consciousness.
Consciousness and cognition March 1, 2009 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2008.04.001 via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractPhenomenal consciousness may be independent of access, and one way to test this is by looking for isomorphisms between phenomenal and neural activation spaces. Using verbal reports to map phenomenal spaces does not undermine this methodology, because mapping activation and phenomenal space through different means does not preclude their identification. The paper concludes by considering how empirical data could address this theoretical question.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 11 |
| Key finding | Using verbal reports to map phenomenal spaces does not prevent identifying isomorphisms between phenomenal and neural activation spaces. |
Abstract
This paper examines the possibility of finding evidence that phenomenal consciousness is independent of access. The suggestion reviewed is that we should look for isomorphisms between phenomenal and neural activation spaces. It is argued that the fact that phenomenal spaces are mapped via verbal report is no problem for this methodology. The fact that activation and phenomenal space are mapped via different means does not mean that they cannot be identified. The paper finishes by examining how data addressing this theoretical question could be obtained.