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Phenomenal and computational in the structures of consciousness

P N Baryshnikov

RUDN Journal of Philosophy September 16, 2018 DOI: 10.22363/2313-2302-2017-21-2-229-239 via DOAJ

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

The computational approach to phenomenal consciousness has explanatory limits, especially regarding subjective experience. The article argues that the causal incompatibility in the mind-body problem stems from the experience of using linguistic signs, along with semiotic and narrative features of memory. Cognitive processes aim to reconcile pure experience with conceptual schemes, but computational models capture only one aspect of mental states. Natural language alone links the bodily organization of subjective experience to the narrative additional reality of phenomenal states. The conceptual system underlying subjective reality emerges from continuously comparing the qualitative properties of sensory experience, stored in memory, with the content of communicative practices.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Qualitative Peer reviewed
Keywords Феноменальное сознание Вычислимость Квалиа Теория информации Языковой знак
Key finding Natural language is the essential link between the bodily organization of subjective experience and the narrative additional reality of phenomenal states, limiting computational models of consciousness.

Abstract

This article focuses on the explanatory limits of the computational approach to the phenomenal consciousness. The principal aim is to analyze the methodological bounds of computational models regarding the content of the subjective phenomenal experience. Special attention is given to the correlation between the information theory and the semantic problems of natural language. We proceed from the assumption that the experience of usage of the linguistic sign, together with semiotic and narrative particularities of memory, is the real reason for the causal incompatibility in the mind-body problem. Cognitive processes are initiated to research the consistency between the results of “pure” experience and conceptual schemes. In this case, the computational models represent only one component of the organization of mental states and their descriptions. The reasonings mentioned in this article are based on the argument that it is solely natural language that is a connecting link between corporal organization of the subjective experience and narrative “additional reality” of the phenomenal states. The realization of the conceptual system, necessary for the formation of the subjective reality, arises from the permanent collation of the qualitative property of sensory experience (fixed in memory) with the content of communicative practices.

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