Immaginare e sperimentare. Gli zombie e il problema della coscienza fenomenica

Thought experiments about phenomenal consciousness have a legitimate and valuable role in philosophy. The paper first surveys the philosophical and scientific background of well-known mind-and-consciousness thought experiments, focusing on problems left unresolved by scientific theories and by attempts to reduce mind to the physical world. A case study of the zombie thought experiment shows how a simple, naive intuition generated complex arguments that have enriched philosophical and intellectual landscape. Overall, philosophy addresses properly philosophical questions about the mind and is not a junior partner to cognitive science.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This paper focuses on the role and value of thought experiments concerning phenomenal consciousness. It is divided in two parts. The first part surveys the philosophical and scientific context in which many well-known thought experiments concerning the mind and consciousness have their roots. In particular it focuses on the problems left open by scientific theories about consciousness and by many attempts to reduce the mind to the physical world. The second part is a case study: it concentrates on the analysis of the zombie thought experiment aiming to show how a simple and rather naive image, the zombie intuition, has originated stimulating and complex arguments, enriching our philosophical and intellectual landscape. On the whole, the paper highlights the fact that there are properly philosophical questions about the mind, philosophy not being a sort of junior partner in the collective enterprise of cognitive science.