[Neurophenomenology: Project for a Science of Past Experiences].

Cognitive science emerged in the mid-20th century as a multidisciplinary field uniting diverse approaches to studying the human mind and knowledge. This theoretical paper critically examines how theoretical biology has addressed cognition, focusing on the enactive project and Francisco Varela's neurophenomenology. It traces the history of cognitive science, the rise of the enactive paradigm, and the "embodied" turn influenced by continental phenomenology. The authors argue that the "hard problem" of consciousness persists due to reductionist views that treat cognition as rational, individual, abstract, and disembodied, reinforcing functionalism in philosophy of mind. They contend that resolving classic dichotomies in mind sciences requires rejecting such assumptions.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Since the middle of 20(th) Century, cognitive science has been recognized as the genuine convergence field for all scientific advances in human mind studies with the mechanisms enabling knowledge. Since then, it has become a multidisciplinary area where several research disciplines and actors have acquired citizenship, allowing new expectations on the scientific study of human uniqueness. Critical assessment of the discussion that the discourse of theoretical biology has been assuming regarding the study of the cognitive phenomenon with special attention to the enactive project and, extensively, to the neuro-phenomenology of Francisco J. Varela. Starting with a brief and synthesized history of cognitive science, we will establish the key principles for understanding the emergence of the enactive paradigm and the "embodied" turn influenced by continental phenomenology in the cognitive science, as well as the general guidelines of Neurophenomenology. The "hard problem" of consciousness still faces several types of reductionism relegating the cognitive issue to a kind of merely rational, individual, abstract and disembodied mechanism, thus strengthening the functionalist paradigm in mind philosophy. A solution to classic dichotomies in mind sciences must start rejecting such assumptions.