Virtual Worlds of Neurophenomenology

The article compares Francisco Varela's and Thomas Metzinger's views on selfhood, finding both reject a stable, centralized self in favor of selfhood as a product of interacting processes. Varela's enactivist approach treats active engagement with the world as crucial to forming selfhood, while Metzinger emphasizes the illusory nature of selfhood through phenomenal self-modeling. Both see perception as inseparable from virtuality and simulation. Ethically, Metzinger warns of issues in creating self-aware AI, whereas Varela sees understanding a non-substantial 'self' as enabling deeper engagement with the world and freedom from rigid selfhood.

Study at a glance

Abstract

In this article, the perspectives of Francisco Varela and Thomas Metzinger on the notion of selfhood are explored, highlighting their differences and similar­ities. The focus is on how the perception of self and the surrounding world is in­separable from elements of virtuality and simulation, which are vital in cognitive processes. Metzinger emphasizes perception’s illusory and simulated nature, whereas Varela considers phenomenal perception an actively created virtual real­ity. Both approaches challenge the traditional view of a stable, centralized ‘self’, seeing selfhood as the result of multiple interacting processes. Varela is centered on an enactivist vision, treating active engagement with the world as a crucial el­ement in forming selfhood. At the same time, Metzinger focuses on phenomenal self-modeling and the illusory nature of selfhood. The article also addresses the ethical differences between the two concepts. Metzinger points to potential issues in creating self-aware AI, while Varela sees in the understanding of a non-substantial ‘self’ the possibility for deeper engagement with the world, suggest­ing freedom from the constraints of rigidly stabilized selfhood and openness to diverse aspects of the environment.