Re-indexing Theories of Consciousness: From Adversarial Comparison to Constraint-Based Harmonization

Multiple theories of consciousness, such as Integrated Information Theory, Global Workspace Theory, and Predictive Processing, often appear incompatible. This paper argues that the incompatibility arises because each theory places a foundational explanatory construct, called an epistemic terminator, at a different level of biological organization and then generalizes from that level as if it alone characterizes consciousness. The authors propose situating these terminators within a biological hierarchy from metabolic regulation to large-scale integration, treating the subject of experience as a derived biological construct. Conscious states are described as having a triadic structure: sense of self, sense of environment, and their association. This framework explains why adversarial tests like COGITATE produce partial support for multiple theories and generates falsifiable predictions about metabolic thresholds and artificial systems lacking metabolic closure.

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Abstract

The scientific study of consciousness is characterized by multiple theoretical frameworks that often appear mutually incompatible. Integrated Information Theory, Global Workspace Theory, Predictive Processing, Recurrent Processing Theory, Higher Order Theory, and biological enactivism each identify different mechanisms or properties as central to consciousness. The present paper proposes that this apparent incompatibility reflects, at least in part, a structural feature of how these theories are formulated rather than a direct conflict regarding a single phenomenon. Each theory places an epistemic terminator, a point at which explanation halts and a construct is treated as foundational, at a different level of biological organization and then generalizes from that level as if it were sufficient to characterize consciousness as a whole.Drawing on a constraint-based framework, these terminators are situated within a biological hierarchy spanning thermodynamic and metabolic regulation, synaptic organization, thalamocortical dynamics, and large-scale integration. Within this hierarchy, the subject of experience is treated not as an ontological primitive but as a derived biological construct arising under specific metabolic and integrative conditions. The paper further proposes that conscious states exhibit a triadic structure comprising sense of self, sense of environment, and the association between them. Within this formulation, Integrated Information Theory characterizes structural integration, Predictive Processing describes temporal updating dynamics, Global Workspace Theory identifies processes associated with global availability, Recurrent Processing Theory describes recurrent content integration, Higher Order Theory captures reflexive accessibility, and enactivism specifies organismic and ecological grounding.This framework provides a possible explanation for why adversarial comparisons between theories, including the COGITATE collaboration, repeatedly produce partial support for multiple accounts without decisive resolution. The framework further generates falsifiable predictions concerning metabolic and integrative thresholds, selective disruption of the triadic structure, and the limitations of current artificial systems lacking metabolic closure and organism-level regulation. Rather than treating existing theories as mutually exclusive, the present account attempts to situate them within a shared explanatory hierarchy and clarify their respective domains of applicability.