The Faithful Response to the Comforting Delusion Objection

The Comforting Delusion Objection argues that psychedelic therapy may improve mental well-being but causes epistemic harm by generating metaphysical beliefs incompatible with naturalism. This paper counters that objection with the Faithful Response: the non-naturalistic attitudes arising from psychedelic experiences are typically forms of faith, not beliefs. Faith is non-doxastic and thus not subject to epistemic evaluation, so it cannot be deemed epistemically harmful. Without such harm, the Comforting Delusion Objection loses its force.

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Abstract

Abstract The Comforting Delusion Objection is a central argument in the emerging field of Philosophy of Psychedelics. It posits that while psychedelics may benefit the mental well-being of individuals they also give rise to epistemically unreliable metaphysical beliefs that are incompatible with a naturalist worldview. Assuming naturalism is the correct stance, the result is significant epistemic harm for patients. For this reason, we should hesitate to use psychedelics as a therapeutic aid. In my counterargument, the Faithful Response, I argue that the Comforting Delusion Objection ultimately fails. This failure stems from the plausible assumption that the non-naturalistic metaphysical attitudes resulting from psychedelic experiences are often not beliefs but forms of faith. Faiths, in turn, are non-doxastic and as such, they are not suitable for epistemic evaluation. Therefore, they cannot be justifiably claimed to be epistemically harmful. If no general epistemic harm arises then the Comforting Delusion Objection loses its force.