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Towards a Mathematical Structure of Global Phenomenal Consciousness

Zoe Lee-Youngzie, Naotsugu Tsuchiya, Martin M. Monti, Donna Dietz

November 6, 2024 preprint DOI: 10.31234/osf.io/2u37y via OpenAlex

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

Qualia—the subjective qualities of experience—can be modeled either by analyzing the internal organization of parts within a single experience or by examining relations between different experiences. A key challenge is combining these two perspectives into a unified account of global conscious experience. This paper describes both types of structural models and their category-theoretic formalizations, then proposes a sheaf-theoretic framework that links mereological parts of experience to empirical measures of their qualia. An application to visual space demonstrates how this framework formally describes the structure of experience and conditions for phenomenal unity. The approach supports empirical research on the relationship between local and global phenomenal qualities and outlines future work toward a structural characterization of global phenomenal consciousness.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper
Keywords Consciousness Epistemology Cognitive science Psychology Philosophy
Key finding A sheaf-theoretic framework integrating mereological and relational structural models of qualia can formally describe the structure of experience and conditions for phenomenal unity, supporting an empirical research program on local and global phenomenal qualities.

Abstract

. In this paradigm, qualia are characterized by modeling the internal organization of parts within an experience, or by modeling external relations between instances of experience. A major next step for the structural approach is to integrate these two perspectives into an account of phenomenally unified global experience. In this paper, we describe these two types of structural models and how their category-theoretic formalizations contribute to the task of identifying the physical bases of phenomenal consciousness. We then propose a sheaf-theoretic framework that integrates these two approaches by mapping mereological parts of experience to empirical measures of their qualia. Through an application to the experience of visual space, we demonstrate that this framework enables a formal description of the structure of experience and conditions for phenomenal unity. We discuss how this integrative approach supports an empirical research program for investigating the relationship between local and global phenomenal qualities, and outline directions for future work toward a structural characterization of global phenomenal consciousness.

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