On the ineffability and the noetic quality of mystical experiences

Mystical experiences are both noetic—providing knowledge—and ineffable, posing an epistemological puzzle. Using Wittgenstein's Tractatus, the paper argues that mystical knowledge lies beyond the limits of language and the world, occupying a liminal, negative space. Though epistemically weak from this perspective, such experiences hold pragmatic and subjective value for religious life.

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Abstract

According to William James, mystical states of consciousness are characterized, among other features, by their noetic quality, i. e., some knowledge obtained is through them. However, another common feature of mystical experiences is their ineffability. This raises an epistemological question: How can something be known, and yet cannot be expressed? Through the conceptual framework of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, we examine mystical experiences as sources of knowledge. In Wittgenstein’s conception, the mystical is placed at a liminal and negative position: it lies outside the limits of language and of the world, and it refers to that which cannot be said. Despite the weak and problematic epistemic foundation of these experiences from Wittgenstein’s early perspective, we conclude with some reflections on their pragmatic and subjective value for the religious dimension of human life.