EXPERIÊNCIAS MÍSTICAS E A HIPÓTESE MCI

The Minimal Counterintuitiveness Hypothesis (MCI) explains the appeal of religious beliefs by claiming they use concepts that mildly violate natural expectations. This paper argues that MCI is hypercognitivist, ignoring the role of emotions and feelings. While MCI may account for some religious beliefs, it fails to explain beliefs arising from mystical experiences, where affective states are central to their adherence.

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Abstract

In this paper an argument is presented against one of the mainstream theories in the cognitive science of religion, the Minimal Counterintuitiveness Hypothesis (MCI). The MCI hypothesis explains the adherence of religious beliefs as a function of the degree of counterintuitiveness of the concepts figuring in the belief’s content. According to MCI, religious beliefs are adherent because they deploy concepts that are moderately counterintuitive, i.e., concepts that break a small number of our natural expectations about the world. We purport that this explanation is hypercognitivist: it neglects the role of non-cognitive states in the explanation of adherence. Though MCI might effectively explain the adherence of some religious beliefs, there are religious beliefs out there whose adherence seems to be much better accounted for by reference to emotions and feelings, which the MCI hypothesis is silent about. One such example, we submit, is that of beliefs prompted by mystical experiences, whose adherence don’t seem to be satisfactorily explained without reference to affective states present in the experience.