Does the Concept of “Altered States of Consciousness” Rest on a Mistake?

The authors argue that many disagreements about consciousness stem from confusing consciousness itself with the contents of consciousness. They build on Block's distinction among phenomenal, access, self, and monitoring consciousness, noting that all share an implicit separation between consciousness and its content. The term "altered state of consciousness" commits a fallacy by treating changes in the content of experience as changes in consciousness itself. To avoid this confusion, the authors propose replacing "altered state of consciousness" with "altered pattern of phenomenal properties," an extension of the concept of a phenomenal field. They discuss implications of this fallacy for theory and research.

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Abstract

Block (2002) has argued that the multiplicity of meanings ascribed to consciousness is due\nto the erroneous treatment of very different concepts as a single concept. Block distinguished\nfour notions of consciousness intended to encapsulate the various meanings attributed to\nthe term: phenomenal, access, self, and monitoring consciousness. We argue that what is\ncommon to all of these definitions is the implicit distinction between consciousness and the\ncontent of consciousness. We critically examine the term “altered state of consciousness”\nand argue that affixing the qualifier “altered state” to consciousness results in a theoretical\nconfusion of consciousness and its content, that is, consciousness is mistaken for the content\nof consciousness. We refer to this as the consciousness/content fallacy and argue that\nit may be avoided if one supplants “altered states of consciousness” with “altered pattern of\nphenomenal properties,” an extrapolation of the term “phenomenal field.” Implications of\nthe consciousness/content fallacy for theory and research are also considered.