The Conscious Nematode: Exploring Hallmarks of Minimal Phenomenal Consciousness in Caenorhabditis Elegans.

Whether simple organisms like nematodes might possess minimal phenomenal consciousness is explored by reviewing current theories of consciousness in light of evidence from Caenorhabditis elegans, a worm with a nervous system of 302 neurons. The authors critically assess models such as global workspace theory, integrated information theory, and unlimited associative learning, and propose empirical approaches using C. elegans to test predictions about consciousness. The review does not reach a definitive conclusion but suggests that C. elegans may be a useful model for investigating the physical mechanisms of phenomenal consciousness.

Study at a glance

Abstract

While subcellular components of cognition and affectivity that involve the interaction between experience, environment, and physiology -such as learning, trauma, or emotion- are being identified, the physical mechanisms of phenomenal consciousness remain more elusive. We are interested in exploring whether ancient, simpler organisms such as nematodes have minimal consciousness. Is there something that feels like to be a worm? Or are worms blind machines? 'Simpler' models allow us to simultaneously extract data from multiple levels such as slow and fast neural dynamics, structural connectivity, molecular dynamics, behavior, decision making, etc., and thus, to test predictions of the current frameworks in dispute. In the present critical review, we summarize the current models of consciousness in order to reassess in light of the new evidence whether Caenorhabditis elegans, a nematode with a nervous system composed of 302 neurons, has minimal consciousness. We also suggest empirical paths to further advance consciousness research using C. elegans.