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A Note on Testing for Phenomenal Consciousness

Ken Steiglitz

SSRN Electronic Journal DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.6925878

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

It is impossible to experimentally verify whether another being or a machine has private experiences. A not-conscious agent can mimic a conscious one, making verification impossible. The proof relies on the presence of noise in the universe, which allows communication to be assumed digital, and the assumption that a conscious agent must be at least as powerful as a universal Turing machine.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key finding A not-conscious agent can mimic a conscious one, so experimental verification of private experiences is impossible.

Abstract

That we cannot experimentally verify that another being or a machine has private experiences is intuitively obvious. I propose a framework and a set of assumptions that allow us to state this precisely and prove it. The proof is straightforward: A not-conscious agent can mimic a conscious one. I rely on the presence of noise in the universe (so that communication can be assumed digital), and the key assumption that to be conscious an agent must be at least as powerful as a universal Turing machine.

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