Russellian monism: ignorance and prospects

Russellian monism, a theory that tries to solve the mind-body problem by positing that physical entities have intrinsic natures (quiddities) that ground consciousness, faces a deep epistemological problem: its core elements are unknowable. This dual ignorance—of quiddity and the factors explaining macro-level consciousness—undermines the theory's explanatory power and cognitive fruitfulness. The paper compares this limitation to Thomistic hylomorphism, a metaphysical system that declined partly due to its own lack of cognitive fruitfulness. Unless Russellian monism overcomes its epistemic deficit, it risks remaining a speculative framework with little prospect for advancing understanding of consciousness or the natural world.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Russellian monism (RM) is regarded by some philosophers as a promising approach to address the mind-body problem. However, this paper argues that RM suffers from a deep epistemological limitation: its core theoretical elements—namely quiddity (the fundamental intrinsic nature of physical entities) and the factors postulated to explain macro-level consciousness—are unknowable. This dual ignorance undermines RM’s explanatory power and jeopardizes its cognitive fruitfulness. To illustrate the seriousness of such a limitation, the paper draws a methodological and structural comparison with Thomistic hylomorphism (TH), a historically prominent but ultimately sterile metaphysical system. Given that TH declined partly due to its lack of cognitive fruitfulness, a similar fate may await RM. Unless RM can overcome this epistemic deficit, it risks remaining a speculative framework, with little prospect for substantive advancement in our understanding of consciousness or the natural world.