The experience of acting and the structure of consciousness.
J Philos August 1, 2017 DOI: 10.5840/jphil2017114829 via PubMed Central
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe experience of acting integrates agentive aspects—those tied to carrying out intentions—with perceptual aspects linked to observable actions in the world. Acting is both an engagement with and intimate acquaintance with the world; in conscious action, an agent consciously intervenes in and experiences the changing world. The author critiques existing accounts of this experience, then develops a new account using Casey O’Callaghan's work on multi-modal perception, and concludes by discussing implications for psychology and philosophy.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 26 |
| Key finding | The experience of acting is an integrated, multi-modal experience that combines agentive and perceptual aspects, making action both an engagement with and acquaintance with the world. |
Abstract
I offer an account of the experience of acting that demonstrates how agentive aspects of experience associated with the execution of intentions are richly integrated with perceptual aspects associated with parts of action taking place in the publicly observable world. On the view I elucidate, the experience of acting is often both an engagement with the world and a type of intimate acquaintance with it. In conscious action the agent consciously intervenes in the world and consciously experiences the world she is changing. In section one, I discuss extant accounts of the experience of acting, noting deficiencies. In sections two and three, I develop my own account, drawing on Casey O’Callaghan’s work on multi-modal perception. In the conclusion, I discuss ramifications for psychology and philosophy.