What matters is not what lies dormant beneath: why AI consciousness is not about biological substrates

The paper argues that the view that biological substrates (as opposed to biological functions) are necessary for consciousness is untenable. It faces a dilemma: if interpreted in an empirically respectable way, it collapses into a biological function view; if interpreted as truly distinct, it becomes empirically intractable and theoretically arbitrary. Therefore, the biological substrate view should be set aside in debates about artificial consciousness. The author suggests that once this view is bracketed, the dispute between biological naturalism and computational functionalism becomes less stark, and progress can focus on identifying which biological or non-biological functions are necessary for consciousness.

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Abstract

A central question in discussions about artificial consciousness is whether biological properties are necessary for consciousness. In this context, biological properties are often divided between two types: biological substrates as opposed to biological functions. In this paper, I argue that the prospects of convincingly ruling out consciousness in (conventional) AI by appealing to a biological substrate view are unpromising. Specifically, I argue that the biological substrate view faces a dilemma: either the view can be interpreted in a way that makes it empirically respectable in principle, but at the cost of collapsing into a biological function view. Or it can be interpreted as really distinct from a biological function view, but at the cost of being empirically intractable and relying on theoretically arbitrary assumptions. On neither horn does the view amount to a distinct and empirically or theoretically convincing, or even slightly plausible, view. Because of this, I wager that the possibility of AI consciousness will not hinge on what lies dormant beneath, and that the biological substrate view is best be bracketed in discussions about AI consciousness. I conclude the paper on a positive note, suggesting that once the biological substrate view is bracketed, certain dialectical stalemates may dissolve and progress can be made. Specifically, what should be pushed to the forefront is that (1) the dispute between biological naturalism and computational functionalism is arguably less stark than it is often taken to be, and that (2) biological function views have various potential explanatory tales to tale about the relevance of biology to consciousness. Because of this, the focus should be on identifying which doings , whether biological or non-biological, are necessary (and sufficient) for consciousness and why.