Il problema mente-corpo in Henri Bergson e l'esternalismo in filosofia della mente. Spunti per un modello ontologico

Bergson's mind-body theory anticipated core ideas of contemporary Externalism and 4E Cognition (embodied, embedded, enactive, extended). His theory of pure perception holds that experience, in its purest state, occurs within things themselves, at a level of reality before experience splits into subject and object. This undivided level is the impersonal origin of subjective consciousness. Bergson's ontology could provide a coherent framework to systematize experimental data within an externalist model, going beyond mere correlation.

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Abstract

In this article we contrast Henri Bergson’s mind-body theory with the latest developments in Philosophy of Mind, more specifically, in so-called “Externalism”. This paper has two specific aims. First, we argue that the work of this French philosopher anticipated the main theoretical concepts of Externalism. Indeed, Bergson’s theory of perception shares many important features, which have not been adequately recognized until now, with so-called 4E Cognition (embodied, embedded, enactive, extended). Second, we show how Bergson’s basic ontology, which frames his interpretation of conscious experience, could offer a coherent theoretical framework to systematize experimental data in an externalist model. Bergson’s theory of “pure perception” goes beyond correlation, showing that our experience, in its purest state, takes place within things themselves, at a level of reality that precedes the bifurcation of experience into a subject and an object. This undivided level of reality can be considered the impersonal origin of subjective consciousness.