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Toward Criteria for Artificial Self-Consciousness: Unity, Normativity, and Agency

B. Scot Rousse

Proceedings of the AAAI Symposium Series May 18, 2026 DOI: 10.1609/aaaiss.v8i1.42563 via OpenAlex

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

A distinction is drawn between two forms of consciousness often conflated in debates about artificial intelligence: pre-reflective experiential awareness and reflective self-consciousness. Pre-reflective awareness involves the minimal self-involvement of phenomenal experience, while reflective self-consciousness entails a unified standpoint from which a subject forms commitments, evaluates them under norms of truth and value, and revises them in light of reasons. Reflective self-consciousness is analyzed in terms of agency, normativity, and unity, with a structure of epistemic answerability that includes commitment formation, persistence, conflict detection, and revision. This distinction clarifies the ethical landscape of artificial consciousness and suggests that emerging artificial systems may pressure inherited moral categories for moral standing.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Conflation Consciousness Agency philosophy Experiential learning Subject documents
Key finding Distinguishing pre-reflective experiential awareness from reflective self-consciousness clarifies the ethical landscape of artificial consciousness and suggests that emerging artificial systems may pressure inherited moral categories for moral standing.

Abstract

This paper distinguishes two forms of consciousness that are often conflated in debates about artificial intelligence: pre-reflective experiential awareness and reflective self-consciousness. Drawing on phenomenology, Kant, and con-temporary philosophy of mind, it argues that pre-reflective awareness involves the minimal self-involvement characteristic of phenomenal experience, while reflective self-consciousness involves a unified standpoint from which a subject can form commitments about how things are, evaluate them under norms of truth and value, and revise them in light of reasons. The paper analyzes reflective self-consciousness in terms of agency, normativity, and unity, articulating a structure of epistemic answerability that includes commitment formation, persistence across time, conflict detection, and re-vision in response to error. Distinguishing these two forms of self-involvement clarifies the ethical landscape of artificial consciousness and suggests that emerging artificial systems may pressure the inherited moral categories through which moral standing has traditionally been understood.

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