Outer and Inner Dimensions of Brain and Consciousness - Refining and Integrating the Phenomenal Layers
Johannes Wagemann, F. Edelhäuser, Ulrich W. Weger
Advances in Cognitive Psychology December 1, 2018 DOI: 10.5709/acp-0248-2 via Semantic Scholar
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe mind–brain problem remains unresolved. By examining neurophilosophical and neuropsychological positions, the problem can be reframed as a structural relation between methodological and content-related aspects, which highlights the need for a new balance between separating and integrating elements. As an alternative, Rudolf Steiner's approach is investigated, which includes a first-person method and the mirror metaphor—the brain as necessary but not sufficient for mental activity. A first-person study using volitionally controlled perceptual reversals reveals a phenomenological distinction between engaging and disengaging forms of mental activity. This initiates discussion of related philosophical concepts and outlines next research steps.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Medicine Psychology Philosophy |
| Citations | 18 |
| Key finding | A first-person study using volitionally controlled perceptual reversals allows for a phenomenological distinction of processual phases summarized as engaging and disengaging forms of mental activity. |
Abstract
In view of the unresolved mind–brain problem, we examine a number of prototypical research attitudes regarding the question, how the mental and the neuronal realms are related to each other, both functionally and ontologically. By discussing neurophilosophical and neuropsychological positions, the mind–brain problem can be recast in terms of a structural relation between methodological and content-related aspects. Although this reformulation does not immediately lead to a solution, it draws attention to the necessity of searching for a new way of balancing separating and integrating elements regarding content as well as method. As a relatively unknown alternative in this context we investigate an approach by the philosopher Rudolf Steiner. It comprises a firstperson method, along with the theoretical background of what has come to be known as the mirror metaphor – an analogy for the brain as a necessary but not a sufficient basis for mental activity. Through a first-person study, this approach is scrutinized using volitionally controlled perceptual reversals. The results allow for a phenomenological distinction of processual phases which can be summarized as engaging and disengaging forms of mental activity. Finally, we initiate a discussion in view of related philosophical concepts and give an outlook on the next possible research steps.