An Existential Attention Norm for Affectively Biased Sentient Beings: A Buddhist Intervention from Buddhaghosa

Attention is pervasively biased by embodied affects, and people are normatively assessable in light of this bias. Buddhist philosophy, particularly the work of Buddhaghosa (5th–6th century CE), offers a rich tradition of normative theorizing about attention. Through an analysis of how wholesome empathy can go wrong, the article argues that Buddhaghosa posits an existential norm of attention: it commands not only proper attention to oneself and the world but also a gradual transformation of one's cognitive-emotional constitution, leading to liberation from suffering.

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Abstract

ABSTRACT This article argues that our attention is pervasively biased by embodied affects and that we are normatively assessable in light of this. From a contemporary perspective, normative theorizing about attention is a relatively new trend (Siegel 2017: Ch. 9, Irving 2019, Bommarito 2018: Ch. 5). However, Buddhist philosophy has provided us with a well-spring of normatively rich theorizing about attention from its inception. This article will address how norms of attention are dealt with in Buddhaghosa’s (5 th -6 th CE) claims about how wholesome forms of empathy can go wrong. Through this analysis, I will show that Buddhist philosophers like Buddhaghosa think there is an existential norm of attention, one that commands us not just to pay attention to ourselves and the world properly, but one whereby we are exhorted to attend to ourselves in a way that gradually transforms our cognitive-emotional constitution so that we become liberated from suffering.