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Consciousness Without Content: A Look at Evidence and Prospects.

Narayanan Srinivasan

Front Psychol August 7, 2020 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01992 via PubMed Central

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

Some Eastern traditions claim that a state of consciousness without any mental content is possible through meditation, but this challenges Western theories that view intentionality—being about something—as essential to consciousness. The ascending reticular arousal system (ARAS) model attempts to explain such minimal phenomenal experience by proposing a special type of non-conceptual content. Examining related states like dreamless sleep may clarify whether contentless consciousness exists. A continuous state without content might also explain the felt continuity of conscious experience. The paper argues for the necessity of postulating consciousness without content and discusses its implications for current theories of consciousness.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Citations 35
Key finding Consciousness without content may be necessary to explain certain minimal phenomenal experiences and the continuity of conscious experience, challenging theories that require intentionality.

Abstract

Many traditions in the East have proposed that consciousness without content is possible and could be achieved with mental training. However, it is not clear whether such a state is possible given that intentionality is a critical property of mentality and consciousness in many theories of consciousness. A prominent recent attempt to account for such states of "minimal phenomenal experience" is the ascending reticular arousal system (ARAS) model, which proposes a specific type of non-conceptual representational content to address such a state. Consciousness without content can also be understood by studying related or similar states of minimal phenomenal experience and this paper discusses such findings from such states including dreamless sleep experience and their implications. One way to argue for the need for proposing consciousness without content is to locate a property of consciousness that would necessitate postulating it. A continuous state of consciousness without content may be needed to understand continuity of conscious experience. Finally, I discuss the implications of consciousness without content for current theories of consciousness.

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