Pohyb života a svět. O fenomenologii a metafyzice světa u Jana Patočky

A new interpretation of Jan Patočka's concept of the natural world, advanced by Renaud Barbaras, contrasts with readings that see Patočka's philosophy as a synthesis of Husserl's reflective consciousness and Heidegger's historical being. Instead, it grounds Patočka's thought in a deeper starting point: life as phusis or nature. This nature serves as the basis for world-forming dynamics but, as the text suggests Barbaras may not have fully considered, also eludes those dynamics. This leads to the concept of the natural world as a "pre-historical" world, found in Patočka's first Heretical Essay on the Philosophy of History, and is supported by his early 1940s manuscripts discussing "pre-everydayness" and "pure nature."

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Abstract

The new interpretation of the concept of the natural world in J. Patočka, introduced by R. Barbaras, as opposed to the interpretation of his philosophy as the synthesis of the philosophy of consciousness or reflective philosophy in E. Husserl, and of the thinking of being in its historicity in M. Heidegger, is grounded in Patočka’s references to a deeper starting point – life in the sense of phusis or nature – which represents a basis of a world-formation dynamics and which, at the same time, which Barbaras perhaps may not have considered enough, eludes this dynamics itself. These references result in the concept of the natural world as the “pre-historical” world, in the first Heretical Essay on the Philosophy of History, and follow from the concepts of “pre-everydayness” and “pure nature” in Patočka’s manuscripts from the early 1940s.