Ontology of inner-body sensations in the focus of fundamental and applied research

Interoceptive sensations—inner-body feelings—have recently become a distinct subject of philosophical inquiry as naturalistic theories of phenomenal consciousness expand with new empirical data and require philosophical analysis. The concept of interoception has shifted meaning across cognitive science and philosophy of consciousness due to methodological constraints of different approaches. This article argues that the concepts of "interoception" and "qualia" are complementary in the ontology of phenomenal consciousness, showing that how we conceptualize inner-body experience depends on the framework used. The analysis traces the formation of the interoception concept and identifies causes of semantic shifts in its content.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Inner-body sensations (interoceptive sensations) have only recently become a full object of philosophy. This is due to the fact that the naturalistic theory of phenomenal consciousness is expanding by new empirical data and requiring philosophical analysis. Also, the traditional object of cognitive sciences is being transformed into a multidimensional philosophical category. At the same time, the study of the mechanisms of the inner-body experience linguistic conceptualization is acquiring particular importance. This article attempts to reveal the complex nature of interoceptive sensations and to show the dependence of the "interoception" volume and content properties on the methodological limitations of various approaches. The article analyzes the stages of the "interoception" concept formation in the cognitive sciences and in the philosophy of consciousness, and identifies the causes of semantic shifts this concept content. The truth of the thesis about the complementarity of the concepts of "interoception" and "qualia" in the ontological aspect of phenomenal consciousness is substantiated.