Building science and subjectivity from flesh. Towards a reconceptualization of neurophenomenology as a contribution to interdisciplinary health research

Radical neurophenomenology rethinks the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity by using the concept of constitution to avoid dualistic frameworks. This paper argues that Merleau-Ponty's later work, especially his notion of the flesh, provides a suitable framework for elaborating a viable concept of co-constitution. Beyond theoretical analysis, the paper illustrates the pragmatic gain of this concept by showing how it should inform the understanding of modern neuroimaging techniques and qualitative phenomenological philosophy analysis of subjectivity and lived experience, thereby contributing to neurophenomenological inquiries.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Radical neurophenomenology offers new ways to re-thinking subjectivity and objectivity, and the relation between them. More specifically, radical neurophenomenology crucially relies on the notion of constitution to circumvent the pitfalls that were associated with older, dualistic frameworks. Building on existing work, our paper has two primary goals. First, we will argue that Merleau-Ponty's later work provides a suitable framework for elaborating a viable concept of (co-)constitution. As we will discuss, it is especially Merleau-Ponty's notion of the flesh which allows for a better way to understand the concept of constitution. However, our paper extends beyond purely theoretical analysis and interpretation. Our second goal is to illustrate the pragmatic gain of our clarificatory efforts by discussing how a viable concept of constitution should affect and inform the understanding of modern neuroimaging techniques and a qualitative phenomenological philosophy analysis of subjectivity and lived experience, and how this contributes to neurophenomenological inquiries.