Ambivalent Tolman: Indirect Influence on Enactivism of Tolman's Sign-Gestaltism Through Merleau-Ponty.

Edward Tolman, known for cognitive maps and latent learning in rats, is usually seen as a forerunner of cognitivism because his intervening variables were later treated as mental representations. Yet the philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty drew on Tolman's sign-Gestalt concept, interpreting it as non-representational and using it in his relational account of behavior. Merleau-Ponty recast Tolman's ideas into a view of behavior as structured, embodied interaction between organism and environment. These reformulated insights later helped found enactivist cognitive science, which emphasizes perception-action co-constitution and dynamic agent-environment coupling. Tolman's own framework remained ontologically ambiguous, allowing his work to influence both cognitivism and its opponent, enactivism.

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Abstract

Edward Tolman, an experimental psychologist renowned for his research on the "cognitive map" and "latent learning" in rats, pursued his career within the tradition of behaviorisms. In the history of psychology, he is positioned as a precursor to cognitivism. This is because the concepts he introduced as intervening variables were later interpreted as having a representational nature. On the other hand, the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty was also influenced by Tolman's concepts, particularly his theory of sign-Gestalt. Merleau-Ponty's ideas, especially as developed in The Structure of Behavior, have had a profound impact on the notion of embodiment within enactivism. Enactivism, as a school of thought opposing representationalism, sharply contrasts with cognitivism, which places Tolman at the intersection of two opposing intellectual currents. This paper, thus, reexamines Tolman's ambivalent nature, exploring how it arose and reassessing his ideas as a precursor not only to cognitivism but also indirectly to enactivism. We argue that Merleau-Ponty inherited Tolman's concept of sign-Gestalt as having a non-representational nature and utilized it within his relational account of behavior. While Tolman's own theoretical framework remained ontologically ambiguous, Merleau-Ponty recast his insights into a conception of behavior as a structured, embodied interaction between organism and environment. These reformulated insights subsequently provided a conceptual foundation for enactivist cognitive science, particularly in its emphasis on the co-constitution of perception and action, and the dynamic coupling of agent and environment. Tolman maintained a behaviorist outlook throughout his early career, but his writing often remained ambiguous; as a result, that ambiguity enabled his work to exert influence on two opposing intellectual traditions at once.