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Are plants cognitive? A reply to Adams.

Miguel Segundo-Ortin, Paco Calvo

Studies in history and philosophy of science February 1, 2019 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.12.001 via PubMed

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

Contrary to F. Adams' claim that plants and bacteria lack cognition because they respond inflexibly to immediate stimuli, empirical evidence from plant neurobiology shows that plant behavior is often analogous to animal behavior. Plants exhibit adaptive behavior, decision-making, anticipation, learning, and memory, and possess a 'phyto-nervous' system. This evidence supports describing plants as cognitive agents in a non-metaphorical way, aligning with enactive and ecological approaches in cognitive science. The article aims to advance public understanding of plant intelligence by challenging anthropocentric assumptions.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Adams Adaptive behavior Anticipation Enactivism Learning
Citations 54
Key finding Plants exhibit adaptive behavior, decision-making, anticipation, learning, and memory, making them suitable to be described as genuine cognitive agents.

Abstract

According to F. Adams [this journal, vol. 68, 2018] cognition cannot be realized in plants or bacteria. In his view, plants and bacteria respond to the here-and-now in a hardwired, inflexible manner, and are therefore incapable of cognitive activity. This article takes issue with the pursuit of plant cognition from the perspective of an empirically informed philosophy of plant neurobiology. As we argue, empirical evidence shows, contra Adams, that plant behavior is in many ways analogous to animal behavior. This renders plants suitable to be described as cognitive agents in a non-metaphorical way. Sections two to four review the arguments offered by Adams in light of scientific evidence on plant adaptive behavior, decision-making, anticipation, as well as learning and memory. Section five introduces the 'phyto-nervous' system of plants. To conclude, section six resituates the quest for plant cognition into a broader approach in cognitive science, as represented by enactive and ecological schools of thought. Overall, we aim to motivate the idea that plants may be considered genuine cognitive agents. Our hope is to help propel public awareness and discussion of plant intelligence once appropriately stripped of anthropocentric preconceptions of the sort that Adams' position appears to exemplify.

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