Enacting a social ecology: radically embodied intersubjectivity.

Embodied cognitive science often describes the mind as “world-involving,” yet the nature of the environment remains poorly specified. This paper argues that enactivists should ally with a dynamic form of ecological psychology, which offers the most explicit theory of the psychological environment. It explores the intersubjective, cultural character of human psychology and the challenges this poses for both enactivist and ecological approaches. The theory of behavior settings (Barker, 1968; Schoggen, 1989) is presented as a framework to address these challenges, yielding an outline of a radical embodied account of intersubjectivity and social activity.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Embodied approaches to cognitive science frequently describe the mind as "world-involving," indicating complementary and interdependent relationships between an agent and its environment. The precise nature of the environment is frequently left ill-described, however, and provides a challenge for such approaches, particularly, it is noted here, for the enactive approach which emphasizes this complementarity in quite radical terms. This paper argues that enactivists should work to find common cause with a dynamic form of ecological psychology, a theoretical perspective that provides the most explicit theory of the psychological environment currently extant. In doing so, the intersubjective, cultural nature of the ecology of human psychology is explored, with the challenges this poses for both enactivist and ecological approaches outlined. The theory of behavior settings (Barker, 1968; Schoggen, 1989) is used to present a framework for resolving some of these challenges. Drawing these various strands together an outline of a radical embodied account of intersubjectivity and social activity is presented.