The metaphysics of perception: enactivism, phenomenology and information.

Enactivism, a leading approach in the philosophy of perception, is metaphysically ambiguous because it claims to avoid both idealism and realism while incorporating elements of each. An earlier attempt to resolve this ambiguity fused enactivism with phenomenology and the mathematical concept of symmetry breaking, but this solution is not entirely successful. Adding a multi-level, non-reductive metaphysics, such as Informational Structural Realism, is proposed. On this view, perception involves causal transfers of information at different levels within a hierarchy of meaningful structures that constitute physical reality. Phenomenologists may use 'perception' metaphorically across all levels, though realists need not.

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Abstract

Enactivism is a major research programme in the philosophy of perception. Yet its metaphysical status is unclear, since it is claimed to avoid both idealism and realism yet still has aspects of both within it. One attempt to solve this conundrum is based on the fusion of enactivism with phenomenology and the mathematical concept of symmetry breaking (Moss Brender, 2013). I suggest this is not entirely successful and propose it needs the addition of a multi-level, non-reductive metaphysics (for example, Informational Structural Realism). The processes we commonly call ‘perception’ are causal transfers of information at certain levels in the hierarchy of meaningful structures that comprise physical reality. Phenomenologists could use the word ‘perception’ metaphorically across all levels, although realists need not do so.