Skip to content

Evolving Enactivism

Daniel D. Hutto, Erik Myin

The MIT Press eBooks May 19, 2017 DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262036115.001.0001

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

Cognition can be divided into two basic types: contentless, interactive forms and content-involving forms. The most elementary cognitive processes—perceiving, imagining, remembering—do not require picking up, storing, or representing information in the brain. Instead, they are fundamentally dynamic, relational, and contentless. Only some forms of cognition involve content. This duplex account of the mind offers a naturalistic explanation of basic minds without introducing scientifically intractable mysteries.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Citations 482
Key finding Basic cognition is contentless and interactive, not involving information processing or representation, while only some forms of cognition involve content.

Abstract

Evolving Enactivism argues that cognitive phenomena—perceiving, imagining, remembering—can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. Building on their earlier book Radicalizing Enactivism, which proposes that there can be forms of cognition without content, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin demonstrate the unique explanatory advantages of recognizing that only some forms of cognition have content while others—the most elementary ones—do not. They offer an account of the mind in duplex terms, proposing a complex vision of mentality in which these basic contentless forms of cognition interact with content-involving ones. Hutto and Myin argue that the most basic forms of cognition do not, contrary to a currently popular account of cognition, involve picking up and processing information that is then used, reused, stored, and represented in the brain. Rather, basic cognition is contentless—fundamentally interactive, dynamic, and relational. In advancing the case for a radically enactive account of cognition, Hutto and Myin propose crucial adjustments to our concept of cognition and offer theoretical support for their revolutionary rethinking, emphasizing its capacity to explain basic minds in naturalistic terms. They demonstrate the explanatory power of the duplex vision of cognition, showing how it offers powerful means for understanding quintessential cognitive phenomena without introducing scientifically intractable mysteries into the mix.

Comments

No comments yet.

Log in to comment