Embodied AI beyond Embodied Cognition and Enactivism

Embodied cognition (EC) has offered artificial intelligence an alternative to traditional computationalism, splitting into weak and strong versions. The weak version borders on functionalism, while the strong version claims body–world interactions constitute cognition. However, the notion of constitution is ontologically problematic and offers no clear empirical or technical benefits. This paper examines ontological issues in both approaches—circularity, epiphenomenalism, mentalism, and disguised dualism—and proposes a more radical alternative called mind-object identity, briefly compared with sensorimotor direct realism and embodied identity theory.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Over the last three decades, the rise of embodied cognition (EC) articulated in various schools (or versions) of embodied, embedded, extended and enacted cognition (Gallagher’s 4E) has offered AI a way out of traditional computationalism—an approach (or an understanding) loosely referred to as embodied AI. This view has split into various branches ranging from a weak form on the brink of functionalism (loosely represented by Clarks’ parity principle) to a strong form (often corresponding to autopoietic-friendly enactivism) suggesting that body–world interactions constitute cognition. From an ontological perspective, however, constitution is a problematic notion with no obvious empirical or technical advantages. This paper discusses the ontological issues of these two approaches in regard to embodied AI and its ontological commitments: circularity, epiphenomenalism, mentalism, and disguised dualism. The paper also outlines an even more radical approach that may offer some ontological advantages. The new approach, called the mind-object identity, is then briefly compared with sensorimotor direct realism and with the embodied identity theory.