REC: Just Radical Enough
Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric August 26, 2015 DOI: 10.1515/slgr-2015-0020 via DOAJ
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractRadical embodied and enactive cognition (REC) is a position that rejects the need for internal representations in explaining cognition. Critics argue REC is either too extreme or not extreme enough. The authors defend REC as appropriately radical, arguing it offers a viable alternative to traditional representational theories of mind, particularly in perception and language. They address common objections and maintain that REC provides a coherent framework without abandoning explanatory power.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Radical enactivism Representational content Perception Language |
| Citations | 25 |
| Key finding | Radical embodied and enactive cognition is just radical enough, offering a viable alternative to representational theories of mind. |
Abstract
We address some frequently encountered criticisms of Radical Embodied/Enactive Cognition. Contrary to the claims that the position is too radical, or not sufficiently so, we claim REC is just radical enough.