Making enactivism even more pragmatic: The Jamesian legacy in Shaun Gallagher’s enactivist approach to cognition

The article identifies substantial similarities between Shaun Gallagher and William James, particularly in their non-representational models of direct perception. By combining James's theories of time and spatial perception with Gallagher's Husserlian-inspired retentional-protentional structure, the authors argue that enactivism's theoretical foundations can be strengthened through an integration of phenomenology and Jamesian pragmatics. James's enactive theory of action and perceptual causality offers a promising basis for a coherent enactivist research program.

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Abstract

The article outlines some similarities between the perspectives adopted by Shaun Gallagher and William James. In particular, assuming that the issue of representation in cognitive systems provides a valuable starting point and testing ground for verifying James’ possible contribution to enactivism, we argue that there is a considerable degree of similarity between Gallagher’s and James’ non-representational models of direct perception. Furthermore, we propose that by combining James’s theory of time and spatial perception with Gallagher’s Husserlian-inspired theory of retentional-protentional structure, we can strengthen the theoretical assumptions of enactivism, integrating elements taken from phenomenology and aspects of Jamesian pragmatics. Understood in this way, James’ enactive theory of action and perceptual causality provides a promising opportunity for an innovative and coherent enactivist research program.