From Autopoiesis to Symbiotic Entanglement: Rethinking Enactivism Through Metabolism and Microbes

Enactivism, a theory that emphasizes the role of the organism's actions in shaping its cognition, has been criticized for relying on outdated science or philosophical speculation. This paper uses recent findings from metabolism and microbiome research to argue that enactivism must update its core concepts. The evidence shows that biological processes like metabolism and interactions between hosts and their microbes are characterized by heteronomy and symbiosis, challenging enactivist ideas of self-production and autonomy. Additionally, this research suggests enactivism should not entirely reject reductionist explanations but instead develop a philosophy of science that integrates them. The authors conclude that enactivism needs to moderate its commitments to autopoietic theory to remain viable.

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Abstract

Enactivism has recently faced criticism for either leaning too heavily on philosophical speculation without clear scientific grounding, or relying on quite old empirical work in cognitive science, especially concerning sensorimotor actions. While one can push back against such charges, in this paper we take a different approach. We will use metabolic and microbiome research as a case study to help make this problem vivid, and to outline a path forward. First, we contend that a closer look at metabolism and microbiota-host interactions places pressure upon some of the core ‘autopoietic’ concepts of enactivism, including self-production, autonomy, and operational closure. This research instead appears to emphasise heteronomy and symbiosis in cognitive, developmental, and evolutionary processes, posing in effect an ontological challenge. Second, it also raises some questions about enactivism’s traditional avoidance of reductionist explanations, suggesting that there is an epistemic need for a philosophy of science that clarifies how to integrate more reductive biological programs within holistic enactivist frameworks. To meet these challenges, we argue that enactivism needs to moderate its commitments to autopoietic theory.