Mechanisms of skillful interaction: sensorimotor enactivism & mechanistic explanation

The mechanistic model of scientific explanation describes explanations as uncovering multi-level, organized components that make up a target phenomenon. Sensorimotor enactivism offers an account of perceptual experience as a skillful, interactive relationship between perceiver and world, not as an internal representation. While these two approaches could complement each other—mechanism explaining subpersonal components of the skillful interaction that enactivism identifies—two challenges arise. The representation challenge arises because implementing sensorimotor interaction seems to require cognitive representations, conflicting with enactivism's nonrepresentational stance. The reconstitution challenge occurs when mechanistic explanation redefines perceptual experience so its components become entirely organism-bound. The paper explores these tensions and possible solutions, clarifying the compatibility and learning opportunities between the two frameworks.

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Abstract

ABSTRACT The mechanistic model depicts scientific explanations as involving the discovery of multi-level, organized components that constitute a target phenomenon. Meanwhile, sensorimotor enactivism purports to offer a scientifically informed account of perceptual experience as a skill-laden interactive relationship, constitutively involving both perceiver and world, rather than as an agent-bound representation of the world. Insofar as sensorimotor enactivism identifies an empirically tractable phenomenon – skillful agent-world interaction – and mechanistic explanation establishes the subpersonal components of this phenomenon, the two approaches allow for a fruitful division of labor in investigating perceptual experience. On closer inspection, however, two challenges arise. First, the “representation challenge” arises because promising attempts to set out implementational details of our sensorimotor interaction with the world implicate cognitive representations, creating tension with sensorimotor enactivism’s nonrepresentational commitments. Second, the “reconstitution challenge” arises when mechanistic explanation not only uncovers the components of some established phenomenon but plays a role in “reconstituting” this phenomenon. This means that, through investigating mechanisms, perceptual experience may be reconceived such that its constituents are wholly organism-bound. We explore both challenges to the compatibility of mechanism and sensorimotor enactivism and examine possible solutions. The result is a clearer understanding of the tensions and opportunities for learning between the frameworks.